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Abstract
In this paper, a rather general online problem called dynamic resource allocation with
capacity constraints (DRACC) is introduced and studied in the realm of posted price mech-
anisms. This problem subsumes several applications of stateful pricing, including but not
limited to posted prices for online job scheduling. As the existing online learning techniques
do not yield no-regret mechanisms for this problem, we develop a new online learning frame-
work defined over deterministic Markov decision processes with dynamic state transition
and reward functions. We then prove that if the Markov decision process is guaranteed to
admit a dominant state in each round and there exists an oracle that can switch the internal
state with bounded loss, a condition that is satisfied in the DRACC problem, then the online
learning problem can be solved with vanishing regret. Our proof technique is based on a
reduction to full information online learning with switching cost (Kalai and Vempala, 2005),
in which an online decision maker incurs an extra cost every time she switches from one arm
to another. We demonstrate this connection formally, and further show how DRACC can
be used in our proposed applications of stateful pricing.
Keywords: Online learning, stateful pricing, online posted pricing, resource allocation
1 Introduction
Price posting is a common selling mechanism across various corners of e-commerce. Its appli-
cations span from more traditional domains such as selling flight tickets on Delta website or
selling products on Amazon, to more emerging domains such as selling cloud services on AWS
or pricing ride-shares in Uber. Not surprisingly, the prevalence of price posting comes from its
several important advantages: it is incentive compatible, simple to grasp, and can easily fit in an
online (or dynamic) environment where buyers arrive sequentially over time. Therefore, online
posted pricing mechanisms, also known as dynamic pricing, have been studied quite extensively
in computer science, operations research, and economics literature (for a comprehensive survey,
see den Boer (2015)).
One method of devising online posted prices, which has been proven to be extremely useful,
is via no-regret online learning algorithms in an adversarial environment (Bubeck et al., 2019,
2017; Feldman et al., 2016; Blum and Hartline, 2005; Blum et al., 2004; Kleinberg and Leighton,
2003). Here, sequence of valuations of buyers are arbitrary, i.e., picked by an adversary, and
the goal is to pick a sequence of posted prices that perform almost as good as the best fixed
posted price in hindsight. Despite its success, a technical limitation of this method forces the
often less natural assumption of unlimited item supply (including in the aforementioned papers).
However, in several applications of online posted pricing the platform needs to keep track of the
state of the sale and prices can potentially depend on this state. Examples are selling resources
of limited supply, in which the state is the number of remaining inventories of different products,
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or selling resources in cloud computing to schedule online jobs, in which the state is which jobs
are currently scheduled.
The above mentioned limitation is in sharp contrast to the posted prices literature that
consider a stochastic setting where the buyers’ values are drawn independently and identi-
cally from unknown distributions (Badanidiyuru et al., 2013; Babaioff et al., 2015; Zhang et al.,
2018), or independently from known distributions (Chawla et al., 2010; Feldman et al., 2014;
Chawla et al., 2017b). By exploiting the randomness (and distributional knowledge) of the input
and employing other algorithmic techniques, these papers handle the more natural assumption
of limited supply, and occasionally more complicated stateful pricing scenarios. However this
approach does not encompass the (realistic) scenarios in which the buyers’ values are correlated
in various complicated ways, scenarios that are typically handled using adversarial models. The
only exception is the work of Chawla et al. (2017a) that takes a different approach. They con-
sider online job scheduling, and given access to a collection of (truthful) FIFO-posted price
scheduling mechanisms they show how to design a (truthful) no-regret online scheduling policy
against this collection in an adversarial environment.
Motivated by the above applications of stateful posted pricing in a detail-free environment,
and inspired by Chawla et al. (2017a), we study the design of no-regret adversarial online learn-
ing algorithms for a rather general stateful online resource allocation framework. In this frame-
work, which is termed as Dynamic Resource Allocation with Capacity Constraints (DRACC),
dynamic resources of limited inventories arrive and depart over time, and an online mechanism
sequentially posts prices to (myopically) strategic buyers with adversarial combinatorial val-
uations. The goal is to post a sequence of prices to maximize revenue, while respecting the
inventory restrictions of dynamic resources for the periods of time in which they are active. We
consider a full-information setting, in which buyers valuations will be elicited by the platform
after posting prices at each time.
Given a collection of pricing policies for the DRACC framework, we aim to design a new
posted pricing policy that obtains vanishing regret with respect to the best fixed pricing policy
in hindsight among the policies in the collection. In order to obtain such a result, we pin down
the right set of modeling assumptions that make this problem tractable (which we justify their
necessity later in Section 6). Using this framework, we investigate other stateful pricing problems
for which existing online learning techniques cannot be exploited to obtain no-regret policies,
and that they are better suited for our framework. Interestingly, our abstract framework with
its assumptions is general enough to admit as special cases two other important applications
of stateful posted pricing, namely online job-scheduling and matching over a dynamic bipartite
graph, which we discuss in details in Section 5.
Our Contributions and Techniques. Our main result is a no-regret posted price mechanism
for the DRACC problem (refer to Section 4, Theorem 4.7 for more technical details ).
For any DRACC instance with T users (under our modeling assumptions in Sec-
tion 2.1) and for any collection Γ of pricing policies, our proposed posted price mech-
anism obtains a regret bound that is sublinear in T against the in-hindsight optimal
policy of Γ (in terms of expected revenue).
Our technique to prove the above result is by abstracting away the details of the pricing
problem, and considering the more general underlying “stateful decision making" problem. To
this end, we introduce a new framework, termed as Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision
Process (Dd-MDP), which generalizes the classic deterministic MDP problem to an adversarial
online learning setting. In this problem a decision maker picks a feasible action at any time given
the current state of the MDP, not knowing the state transitions and the rewards associated with
each transition. The state transition functions and rewards are then revealed. The goal of the
decision maker is to pick a sequence of actions that maximizes reward. In particular, we look
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at no-regret online learning, where the decision maker is trying to minimize regret and regret is
defined with respect to the best fixed in hindsight policy (i.e., a mapping from states to actions)
among policies in a given collection Γ.
Not surprisingly, no-regret online learning is not possible for this general problem (see Propo-
sition 2.1). Inspired by the DRACC problem and its application, we introduce a critical struc-
tural condition on Dd-MDP which makes no-regret online learning possible. This condition
ensures the existence of “dominant” states, that are states that satisfy the following property:
by magically switching its internal state to the dominant state at any time, any policy can always
weakly obtain more future reward. Moreover, it ensures the existence of switching procedures,
termed as “chasing” oracles, that can switch the internal state of a policy to a dominant state
with affordable loss.
Given the Dominance & Chasing condition above, our main technical contribution is to
show a reduction from designing no-regret online policies for Dd-MDP to the well-studied (classic
stateless) setting of online learning with switching costs and experts’ advice (Kalai and Vempala,
2005). Given any no-regret algorithm for the latter problem, we design a new policy called
Chasing & Simulation (C&S) for Dd-MDP that uses this algorithm in a blackbox fashion. At
high level, we have one arm for each policy in the given collection, and C&S invokes the switching
cost algorithm to find the next policy to pick. Each time this algorithm suggests a different policy,
we invoke the chasing oracle to ensure ending up at a dominant state first (chasing phase), and
then we simulate the new suggested policy from the beginning to find which actions to pick until
the next time we have a switch (simulation phase). In summary, we obtain the following result
(see Theorem 3.2 in Section 3 for more details)
For any Dd-MDP instance with T rounds and satisfying the (approximate) Dom-
inance&Chasing condition (Section 3.1), and any collection Γ of policies, Chas-
ing&Simulation (Algorithm 1) obtains a regret bound sublinear in T against the best
in-hindsight policy in Γ.
Our frameworks, both for stateful decision making and stateful pricing, are rather general
and we believe that more problems will turn out to fit them. We study two of them in the
applications section, and we leave investigating more applications as a future direction.
Additional Related Work and Discussions. In the DRACC problem, the class of feasible
prices at each time t is determined by the remaining inventories, which in turn depends on
the prices picked at previous times t′ < t. This kind of dependency cannot be handled by the
conventional online learning algorithms, such as follow-the-perturbed-leader Kalai and Vempala
(2005) and EXP3 Auer et al. (2002). That is why we aim for the stateful model of online
learning, which allows a certain degree of dependence on the past actions.
Several attempts have been made to formalize and study stateful online learning models.
The authors of Arora et al. (2012); Feldman et al. (2016) consider an online learning framework
where the reward (or cost) at each time depends on the k recent actions for some fixed k > 0.
This framework can be viewed as a reward function that depends on the system’s state that, in
this case, encodes the last k − 1 actions.
There is an extensive line of work on online learning models that address general multi-state
systems, typically formalized by means of stochastic Even-dar et al. (2005); Guan et al. (2014);
Yu et al. (2008); Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2013); Neu et al. (2014) or deterministic Dekel and Hazan
(2013) MDPs. The disadvantage of these models from our perspective is that they all have
at least one of the following two restrictions: (a) all actions are always feasible regardless
of the current state Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2013); Even-dar et al. (2005); Guan et al. (2014);
Yu et al. (2008); or (b) the state transition function is fixed (static) and known in advance
Dekel and Hazan (2013); Even-dar et al. (2005); Guan et al. (2014); Neu et al. (2014); Yu et al.
(2008).
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In the DRACC problem, however, not all actions (price vectors) are feasible for every state
and the state transition function at time t is revealed only after the decision maker has com-
mitted to its action. Moreover, the aforementioned MDP-based models require a certain type
of state connectivity in the sense that the Markov chain induced by each action should be
irreducible Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2013); Even-dar et al. (2005); Guan et al. (2014); Neu et al.
(2014); Yu et al. (2008) or at least the union of all induced Markov chains should form a strongly
connected graph Dekel and Hazan (2013). In contrast, in the DRACC problem, depending on
the inventories of the resources, it may be the case that certain surplus vectors can never be
reached (regardless of the decision maker’s actions).
On the algorithmic side, a common feature of all aforementioned online learning models is
that for every instance, there exists some k > 0 that can be computed in a preprocessing stage
(and does not depend on T ) such that the online learning can “catch” the state (or distribution
over states) of any given sequence of actions in exactly k time units. While this feature serves as
a corner stone for the existing online learning algorithms, it is not present in our model, hence
our online learning algorithm has to employ different ideas.
In Devanur et al. (2011); Kesselheim et al. (2014); Agrawal and Devanur (2015), a family
of online resource allocation problems is investigated under a different setting from ours. The
resources in their problem models are static, which means that every resource is revealed at
the beginning, and remains active from the first user to the last one. Different from our adver-
sarial model, these papers take different stochastic settings on the users, such as the random
permutation setting where a fixed set of users arrive in a random order Kesselheim et al. (2014);
Agrawal and Devanur (2015), and the random generation setting where the parameters of each
user are drawn from some distribution Devanur et al. (2011); Agrawal and Devanur (2015). In
these papers, the assignment of the resources to the requests are fully determined by a single
decision maker, and the decision for each request depends on the revealed parameters of the
current request and previous ones. By contrast, we study the scenario where each strategic user
makes her own decision of choosing the resources, and the price posted to each user should be
specified independently of the valuation of the current user.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we formalize the problem of designing no-regret posted price mechanisms for
the DRACC setting, and then formalize its generalization to no-regret online learning for the
abstract Dd-MDP setting. In principle, both of these problems are examples of online learning in
a stateful environment. We further dig into the connection between the two settings in Section 4.
2.1 DRACC : Notations, Basics & Online Learning
In the DRACC problem, we haveN dynamic resources and T strategic users arriving sequentially
over times t = 1, . . . , T . For each dynamic resource i ∈ [N ], c(i) units of this resource arrive at
time ta(i) and they all expire at time te(i), where 1 ≤ ta(i) ≤ te(i) ≤ T . We say a resource i is
active at time t if ta(i) ≤ t ≤ te(i), and denote the set of all active resources at this time t by
At ⊆ [N ]. Let C = maxi∈[N ] c(i), and W = maxt∈[T ] |At|. At each time t, the set of resources
that arrive at the beginning of this time, i.e., ta(i) = t, and the set of resources that depart after
the end of this time, i.e., te(i) = t, are revealed. An arriving user at time t has a valuation set
function vt(·) : 2
At → [0, 1) for subsets of active resources at this time. We assume vt(∅) = 0.
Moreover, users are quasi-linear, i.e., if a subset A of resources is allocated to user t and she
pays a total payment of q in return, her utility will be vt(A)− q.
Posted Price Mechanisms. We restrict our attention to dynamic posted price mechanisms
that work based on a protocol as follows. At each time t = 1, . . . , T , the mechanism first realizes
4
which new resources arrive at this time and hence are active, and which resources have departed
at time t − 1 and hence are not active anymore. It then posts a vector of prices p ∈ (0, 1]At
for active resources, where p(i) is the price that arriving user should pay if it is allocated active
resource i. It then elicits the arriving user’s valuation function vt. Finally, a unit of each resource
in the demand set Aˆpt of user t is allocated to that user and she pays qˆ
p
t to the mechanism, where
Aˆ
p
t ∈ argmax
A∈At
vt(A)−
∑
i∈A
p(i) , qˆpt =
∑
i∈Aˆpt
p(i) (1)
The crux of posted price mechanisms is that if the price vector p is determined independently
of the valuation function vt, then it is a dominant strategy for (myopic) user t to report vt
truthfully. To ensure inventory feasibility of the posted pricing mechanism, we force p(i) = 1
for an exhausted resource i; in this way, since vt is strictly smaller than 1, a user’s utility will
be negative upon receiving any units of an exhausted resource, which cannot happen as utility
obtained from the empty set is 0.
In this paper, we aim for a posted price mechanisms that maximizes the extracted revenue,
which is the total expected payment received from all users E
[∑T
t=1 qˆ
pt
t
]
, where the expectation
is over internal randomness of the pricing mechanism (as we allow randomized prices).1
Online Learning, Feasible One-shot Policies & Regret. To design posted price mech-
anisms, we consider a full-information adversarial online learning framework. At each time t,
a decision maker picks the price vector pt and an oblivious adversary simultaneously picks the
valuation function vt. The adversary also selects arrival times ta(i), expiry times te(i), and
inventory sizes c(i) of resources upfront, and reveals them to the decision maker in an online
fashion (upon arrival or departure of a dynamic resource) as discussed earlier. Roughly speak-
ing, the goal of the decision maker is to generate a sequence of prices p1, . . . ,pT that extracts
as much revenue as possible.
Formally, let λt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , C}
|At| denote the remaining inventories of active resources at
time t, also termed as active resources surplus vector. A (feasible) one-shot pricing policy is
then a mapping γ(·) from each possible surplus vector λ to a price vector p, so that (i) p has
the same dimension as λ; and (ii) if λ(i) = 0 for some resource i, then p(i) = 1.2 Given a
pricing policy γ, we consider a benchmark that is the total revenue extracted by a decision
maker who follows pricing policy γ. This decision maker posts prices pγt = γ(λ
γ
t ) recursively,
i.e., by applying mapping γ repeatedly on previous surplus vectors λt′ and posting prices γ(λt′)
at times t′ = 1, . . . , t − 1. Denoting qˆγt = qˆ
p
γ
t
t , the revenue generated by γ can be written as∑T
t=1 qˆ
γ
t .
Now, consider a collection Γ of feasible one-shot pricing policies. The quality of a posted
price mechanism {pt} is measured by means of the decision maker’s regret that compares her
own revenue to the revenue generated by the best pricing policy in Γ in hindsight. Formally, the
regret (with respect to Γ) is defined to be
max
γ∈Γ
T∑
t=1
qˆ
γ
t − E
[
T∑
t=1
qˆ
pt
t
]
,
where the expectation is taken over the decision maker’s randomness. The mechanism is called
no-regret if it is guaranteed that the decision maker’s regret is sublinear in T , which means that
the average regret per time unit vanishes as T →∞.
1The techniques we use in this paper are applicable also for the objective of maximizing the social welfare.
2Recall that for any t ∈ [T ] and A ⊆ At, vt(A) is strictly less than 1. Therefore, a feasible pricing policy
ensures that a resource i with λ(i) = 0 will not be allocated to a user.
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Modeling Assumptions. In our treatment of DRACC, we make a few assumptions:
• Bounded parameters: The collection Γ of pricing policies is given as input by an oblivious
adversary, and its size is assumed to satisfy
(C ·W +D) · log |Γ| = o(T ) . (2)
where the parameter D is defined to be a non-negative real number such that for any
dynamic resource i, j ∈ [N ],
ta(i) +D ≤ ta(j) ⇒ te(i) ≤ te(j) . (3)
• Finite discrete prices: posted prices are restricted to a finite subset P ⊂ (0, 1] that explic-
itly contains the price 1.3
2.2 Dd-MDP: Notations, Basics & Online Learning
We start by formalizing the static decision process. We then introduce our dynamic setting,
which is a generalization of the online learning framework introduced in Dekel and Hazan (2013)
to a setting where rewards of the decision process are non-stationary and selected by an oblivious
adversary.
The static setting. A deterministic Markov Decision Process (d-MDP) is associated with a
set of states S and a set of actions X . Each state s ∈ S is associated with a subset Xs ⊆ X
of actions, which are called the feasible actions of s. For each state s ∈ S and each action
x ∈ Xs, a state transition function g(s, x) maps the state-action pair (s, x) to a new state s
′.
It induces a directed graph with vertex set S, termed as the state transition graph, where a
node s is connected to a node s′ by a directed edge (s, x) with x ∈ Xs iff g(s, x) = s
′. Usually,
the transition digraph is assumed to be strongly connected. There is also a transition reward
function f(·) that maps each state-action pair (s, x), i.e., each directed edge of the transition
graph, to a real value in [0, 1]. Generally speaking, the goal of a decision maker in this setup
is to pick a sequence of actions and move between states so as to maximize her accumulated
reward.
Dynamic Deterministic MDP & Online Learning. Our proposed online learning frame-
work, which generalizes the setup of Dekel and Hazan (2013), is a sequential game played be-
tween an online decision maker and an adversary. The game is defined by a set of states S, a set
of actions X , feasible actions sets {Xs}s∈S (as in the static d-MDP), and a number of rounds
T ∈ N. We further assume states and actions are discrete and finite. The game is played as fol-
lows. The decision maker starts from the initial state s0. At each time t = 1, . . . , T , the decision
maker plays a (randomized) feasible action xt ∈ Xst−1 , where st−1 is the current state at the
beginning of time t. Simultaneously, the adversary selects the state transition function gt(s, x)
and the reward function ft(s, x) at time t. We further restrict our attention to non-adaptive
adversaries.4 After the selections of the two parties, the decision maker moves to a new state
st = gt(st−1, xt) (which can be viewed as a movement along the directed edge (st−1, xt) in the
transition graph defined by gt), obtains a reward of ft(st−1, xt), gets to know the state transition
function gt(·) and transition reward function ft(·), and finally the sequential game moves to its
3Since the collection Γ is specified by the adversary, its size does not directly depend on |P|, C and W . Thus,
we do not make any further assumption on how |P|, C and W are bounded.
4This means that the adversary chooses its transition and rewards functions at the beginning of the game,
possibly based on the algorithm that the decision maker will use, but without knowing the actual realization of
actions.
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next round.5. The decision maker aims to maximize the expected value E
[∑
t∈[T ] ft(st−1, xt)
]
of the cumulative reward.
Feasible One-shot Policies, Simulation & Regret. Similar to our treatment for the
DRACC problem in Section 2.1, we consider one-shot policies for the Dd-MDP problem. For-
mally, a one-shot policy γ : S 7→ X maps each state s to an action x = γ(s). A policy is said to
be feasible if γ(s) ∈ Xs for every state s ∈ S. Now we can consider simulation of a fixed policy
γ from time 1 to t by a decision maker in our above sequential game. Formally, define sγ(t) and
xγ(t) as follows.
sγ(t) ,
{
s0 if t = 0;
gt
(
sγ(t− 1), γ
(
sγ(t− 1)
))
otherwise
, and
xγ(t) ,
{
γ(s0) if t = 1
γ
(
sγ(t− 1)
)
otherwise
.
The cumulative reward obtained by simulating a fixed policy γ is
∑
t∈[T ] ft
(
sγ(t− 1), xγ(t)
)
.
Now, given a (finite) set of feasible policies Γ, the regret of the decision maker, who (sequentially)
generates action-state pairs (s0, x1), . . . , (sT−1, xT ), w.r.t. the best in hindsight fixed policy in
Γ is defined as
max
γ∈Γ
∑
t∈[T ]
ft
(
sγ(t− 1), xγ(t)
)
−
∑
t∈[T ]
E
[
ft(st−1, xt)
]
. (4)
An online decision maker is said to be no-regret if the upper bound on the regret is sublinear
in T , which means that the average regret vanishes as T → ∞. Our objective is to develop
no-regret online decision making algorithms for this setting.
We conclude this section by showing the impossibility of no-regret for general Dd-MDP
(similar to Arora et al. (2012)).
Proposition 2.1. There is an instance of Dd-MDP problem in which any online learning algo-
rithm obtains a regret no smaller than Ω(T ).
Proof. Consider a simple scenario where there are only two states {s0, s1} and two actions
{x0, x1} that are feasible for both states. Without loss of generality, let x0 be the action that
the algorithm would choose with probability at least 12 at time t = 1. Now consider an adversary
that works in the following manner. It sets ft(s0, ·) = 1, and ft(s1, ·) = 0 at each time t ∈ [T ].
Regarding the state transition, the adversary sets g1(s0, x0) = s1, g1(s0, x1) = s0, and for every
t ∈ [2, T ], gt(s0, ·) = s0, and gt(s1, ·) = s1. In such case, the expected cumulative reward of the
algorithm is at most 12T + 1, while the best fixed policy in hindsight, which is always playing
action x1, ensures that the cumulative reward is T . Therefore, regret is at least Ω(T ).
3 No-regret for Dd-MDP with Dominance and Chasing
Motivated by the DRACC problem discussed in Section 2.1, and especially its application in
online job scheduling, which we elaborate in Section 5, we restrict our attention to a special class
of Dd-MDP instances. In particular, we consider a class of instances that satisfy a structural
condition called “Dominance and Chasing”.
5Notably, the transition graphs at times t = 1 . . . T are not assumed to be strongly connected. These features
of Dd-MDPs make it difficult or even impossible to plan a path with desired length between two given states as
in Dekel and Hazan (2013).
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3.1 Dominance and Chasing Conditions
For an instance of Dd-MDP, we say that this instance satisfies the σ-Dominance&Chasing con-
dition for some parameter σ > 0 if there exists a sequence of states {s∗t}t∈[T ], referred to as
σ-dominant states, that satisfy the following:
• Domination: for any policy γ ∈ Γ and any time interval [t1, t2], we have:
t2∑
t=t1
ft
(
sˆ(t− 1), xγ(t)
)
≥
t2∑
t=t1
ft
(
sγ(t− 1), xγ(t)
)
− σ . (5)
where sˆ(t1 − 1) = s
∗
t1
and sˆ(t) = gt (sˆ(t− 1), x
γ(t)) for t ∈ [t1, t2]. Moreover, it is required
that xγ(t) is a feasible action for state sˆ(t− 1), i.e., xγ(t) ∈ Xsˆ(t−1) for every t ∈ [t1, t2].
• Online Chasing: there exists a chasing oracle OChasing that works as follows. For any
initial time tinit and initial state sinit, it generates a sequence of (possibly randomized)
actions {xˆ(t)}t=tinit:tfinal (and implicitly a sequence of states {sˆ(t)}t=tinit−1:tfinal), starting
from tinit and terminating at tfinal > tinit, where
sˆ(t) =
{
sinit if t = tinit − 1;
gt
(
sˆ(t− 1), xˆ(t)
)
if t ∈ [tinit, tfinal]
(6)
Moreover, xˆ(t) is a feasible action for state sˆ(t − 1) for t ∈ [tinit, tfinal]. We assume the
chasing oracle OChasing satisfies two properties:
(a) Termination at a dominant state: either state s∗tfinal is reached at tfinal, or tfinal = T .
(b) Bounded chasing regret: the Chasing Regret (CR) of the oracle is bounded by σ, i.e.,
CR , max
τ∈[tinit,tfinal]
max
γ∈Γ
(
τ∑
t=tinit
ft
(
sγ(t− 1), xγ(t)
)
−
τ∑
t=tinit
E
[
ft
(
sˆ(t− 1), xˆ(t)
)])
≤ σ .
3.2 Online Learning with Switching Cost
In order to design no-regret algorithms for Dd-MDP under dominance & chasing, we develop
techniques that are related to the full-information adversarial model of Online Learning with
Switching Cost (OLSC) Kalai and Vempala (2005). We briefly describe this framework here.
Using a blackbox algorithm for this problem, Section 3.3 shows how to obtain vanishing regret
for our problem.
In the OLSC problem, there is a set of actions/arms/experts Γ, and T ∈ N rounds. At
each round t ∈ [T ], an adversary specifies a reward function Ft : Γ 7→ [0, 1], which is unknown
to the online algorithm in the beginning of this round. Simultaneously, the algorithm chooses
an action γt ∈ Γ. Then the reward function Ft(·) is revealed to the algorithm. The goal
of the algorithm is to pick a sequence of actions γ1, . . . , γT in an online fashion to maximize
E
[∑
t∈[T ] Ft(γt)
]
−∆ ·
∑T
t=2 1γt 6=γt−1 , where ∆ ·
∑T
t=2 1γt 6=γt−1 is essentially the extra cost that
the algorithm incurs due to switching its actions and the parameter ∆ > 0 is referred to as the
switching cost. The regret is defined to be
max
γ∈Γ
∑
t∈[T ]
Ft(γ)−
∑
t∈[T ]
E
[
Ft(γt)
]
+∆ ·
T∑
t=2
1γt 6=γt−1 .
Theorem 3.1 (Kalai and Vempala (2005)). For the OLSC problem with a switching cost ∆,
there exists an algorithm A with regret O
(√
∆ · T log |Γ|
)
.
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ALGORITHM 1: Chasing & Simulation
Input: Policy set Γ, algorithm A, oracle OChasing, initial state s0;
Output: Sequence of actions x1, . . . , xT , (implicitly) sequence of states s1, . . . , sT ;
Start from initial state s0;
for each round t ∈ [T ] do
Invoke algorithm A to pick a policy γt at the beginning of t;
if t > 1
∧
γt 6= γt−1 then
Stop current run of oracle OChasing, if still running;
Restart a new run of oracle OChasing with initial state st−1 and initial time t;
Pick the action xt ← xˆ(t) chosen by oracle O
Chasing;
end
else
if OChasing is running then
Pick the action xt ← xˆ(t) chosen by oracle O
Chasing;
end
else
Compute action xγt(t) by simulating policy γt up to time t and pick it;
end
end
for each γ ∈ Γ do
Compute ft(s
γ(t− 1), xγ(t)) by simulating policy γ up to time t;
Let Ft(γ)← ft(s
γ(t− 1), xγ(t)), and feed it to A as the reward of action γ;
end
end
3.3 Chasing & Simulation Algorithm and Analysis
We now present our algorithm for the class of Dd-MDP problems satisfying σ-Dominance&Chasing
condition. Our algorithm, called Chasing and Simulation (C&S), requires blackbox access to
an algorithm A for the OLSC problem, where the action set is set to be the collections of poli-
cies Γ for the Dd-MDP problem, there are T rounds and the switching cost is set to ∆ = 2σ.
With blackbox access to the chasing oracle OChasing (with chasing regret bounded by σ) and
an algorithm A for OLSC (that guarantees the regret bound in Theorem 3.1), the procedure of
C&S is described in Algorithm 1. It starts to run from the given state s0 as follows. At the
beginning of each round t ∈ [T ], C&S invokes Algorithm A to choose a policy γt from Γ. If γt
is different from the one chosen in the last step or t = 1, then C&S stops the chasing oracle
OChasing if it is running, starts a new run of OChasing with st−1 as the initial state and t as the
initial time, and takes the action generated by OChasing. If γt = γt−1 and O
Chasing is running,
then C&S takes the action yielded by OChasing as well. Otherwise, C&S computes the action
xγt(t) by simulating the policy γt up to t, and takes this action. After C&S makes its decision
for round t, the reward function ft(·, ·) is revealed. C&S then computes ft(s
γ(t− 1), xγ(t)) for
every policy γ ∈ Γ by simulation, and feeds Ft(γ) = ft(s
γ(t− 1), xγ(t)) to Algorithm A as the
reward of γ at t.
Theorem 3.2. The regret of C&S (Algorithm 1) is bounded by O
(√
σ · T log |Γ|
)
.
Proof. Divide the T rounds into a sequence of consecutive episodes {1, 2, · · · , θ, · · · , } so that
the policy chosen by A does not change during an episode, and a new episode starts whenever
A changes the policy. Let tθ and t
′
θ be the first round and the last round of the episode θ,
respectively. Now consider an arbitrary episode θ.
First, suppose that in this episode the chasing oracle OChasing does not terminate before or
at t′θ. By the fact that C&S algorithm follows actions generated by O
Chasing during [tθ, t
′
θ], and
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by definition of chasing regret, we have
t′
θ∑
t=tθ
Ft(γtθ )−
t′
θ∑
t=tθ
E
[
ft(st−1, xt)
]
=
t′
θ∑
t=tθ
ft
(
sγtθ (t− 1), xγtθ (t− 1)
)
−
t′
θ∑
t=tθ
E
[
ft(st−1, xt)
]
≤ σ ≤ ∆ .
Now consider the case where in the episode θ, the chasing oracle OChasing terminates at some
round tˆθ ≤ t
′
θ. Again, by definition of chasing regret, we have:
tˆθ∑
t=tθ
Ft(γtθ )−
tˆθ∑
t=tθ
E
[
ft(st−1, xt)
]
≤ σ .
Moreover, the chasing oracle OChasing ensures that C&S is at the dominant state s∗
tˆθ
at the
beginning of tˆθ. Using the dominant condition, we have
t′
θ∑
t=tˆθ+1
Ft(γtθ )−
t′
θ∑
t=tˆθ+1
ft(st−1, xt) =
t′
θ∑
t=tˆθ+1
ft
(
sγtθ (t− 1), xγtθ (t− 1)
)
−
t′
θ∑
t=tˆθ+1
ft
(
sˆ(t− 1), xγtθ (t− 1)
)
≤ σ ,
where {sˆ(t)}t=tˆθ+1:t′θ
is the sequence of states generated by following actions generated by simu-
lating policy γtθ (from the beginning up to time t, for t = tˆθ+1 to t
′
θ), but this time starting from
the dominant state s∗
tˆθ
at time tˆθ + 1 (as described in the domination property in Section 3.1).
Therefore,
t′
θ∑
t=tθ
Ft(γtθ )−
t′
θ∑
t=tθ
E
[
ft(st−1, xt)
]
≤ 2σ = ∆ .
For any policy γ ∈ Γ, we have
∑
t∈[T ]
ft
(
sγ(t− 1), xγ(t)
)
−
∑
t∈[T ]
E
[
ft(st−1, xt)
]
≤
∑
t∈[T ]
ft
(
sγ(t− 1), xγ(t)
)
−
∑
θ
[ t′θ∑
t=tθ
E
[
Ft(γtθ )
]
−∆
]
=
∑
t∈[T ]
Ft(γ)−
[ ∑
t∈[T ]
E
[
Ft(γ
′
t)
]
−∆ ·
T∑
t=2
1γ′t 6=γ′t−1
]
,
where for every episode θ and every round t ∈ [tθ, t
′
θ], γ
′
t = γtθ . By Theorem 3.1, the formula
above is bounded by O
(√
∆ · T log |Γ|
)
= O
(√
σ · T log |Γ|
)
.
So far, we have only considered the notion of policy regret defined in Eq. (4). To complement
our result, we consider another natural alternative definition for regret, known as external regret,
defined as follows (see Arora et al. (2018) for more details).
max
γ∈Γ
∑
t∈[T ]
ft
(
st−1, γ(st−1)
)
−
∑
t∈[T ]
E
[
ft(st−1, xt)
]
. (7)
In words, while policy regret is the difference between the simulated reward of the optimal
fixed policy and the actual reward of the algorithm, in external regret the reward that is being
accredited to the optimal fixed policy in each round t is the reward that policy would have
obtained when being in the actual state of the algorithm (versus being in its simulated current
state). In Section 7, we show for Dd-MDP with dominance & chasing condition obtaining
both sublinear external regret and sublinear policy regret is impossible, and hence we focus on
obtaining vanishing policy regret.
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4 No-regret Posted Pricing: Reduction from DRACC to Dd-
MDP
This section designs a learning-based posted price mechanism (LBPP) for the DRACC problem
using the C&S algorithm, and prove that this mechanism is no-regret.
The mechanism LBPP works as follows. It first provides the initial input parameters to the
Algorithm C&S, including the collection Γ of policies, the OLSC algorithm A, the chasing oracle
OChasing and the initial state s0. In particular, the existence of the algorithm A is guaranteed
in Lemma 3.1, and the desired chasing oracle OChasing is constructed at the end of this section.
Without loss of generality, we assume that ta(1) = 1, because otherwise the users i with i < ta(1)
can never get any resource. Therefore, the initial state s0 can be specified by setting it to〈
c(i)
〉
i∈A(1)
, and this can be done before the arrival of the first user.
When the user starts to arrive, LBPP invokes C&S to obtain the first action x1 ∈ Xs0 , and
posts x1 as the price vector for the user t = 1. Next, upon the arrival of each user t ∈ [2, T ], LBPP
constructs the reward function ft−1 and the state transition function gt−1, which are described
in detail later. After these two functions are fed to C&S, C&S chooses a new action xt, and
LBPP posts xt as the price vector for the user t. This process proceeds iteratively until all the T
users have been processed.
For every t ∈ [2, T ], the reward function ft−1(s, x) is constructed for every state-action pair
(s, x) with x ∈ Xs as follows:
ft−1(s, x) = qˆ
x
t−1 , (8)
where qˆ xt−1 is defined in Eq. (1) for the payment of user t − 1 given the price vector x. Note
that the function fT (s, x) can also be defined in the same way, although it is only used in the
analysis. By Eq. (1), the computation in Eq. (8) only relies on vt−1, which is available upon the
arrival of the user t due to the truthfulness of LBPP. Therefore, the reward function ft−1(s, x) is
computable.
Recall that the valuation function vt of every user t is fixed by the adversary in advance, and
does not change with the state. Then, it can be inferred from Eq. (8) that for any two states
s, s′ and an action x which is feasible for both s and s′, performing x on s and s′ always gives
the same reward. A formal statement of this observation is given as follows.
Lemma 4.1. For each t ∈ [T ] and any two states s, s′ ∈ S, it holds for every action x ∈ Xs
⋂
Xs′
that ft(s, x) = ft(s
′, x).
Now let us consider the construction of the state transition function gt−1(s, x). Recall that the
each state s is corresponding to a surplus vector. We construct the surplus vector s′ = gt−1(s, x)
as follows. For each resource i ∈ At,
s′(i) =
{
s(i)− 1
i∈Aˆxt−1
if i ∈ At−1
c
(
i
)
otherwise
.
For two states s and s′, we say s 4 s′ if s and s′ encodes the surpluses of the same set A
of active resources and for each item i ∈ A, s(i) ≤ s′(i). Then the construction of the state
transition function gives the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. For any two states sa and sb with sa 4 sb, any action x ∈ Xsa
⋂
Xsb and any
t ∈ [T − 1], it holds that gt(sa, x) 4 gt(sb, x).
Proof. Let s′a = gt(sa, x), and s
′
b = gt(sb, x). For every resource i ∈ At+1 −At, it trivially holds
that s′a(i) = c
(
i
)
= s′b(i).
Now consider the resource i ∈ At
⋂
At+1. By definition, Aˆ
x
t is fully determined by the
valuation function vt of user t and the price vector x. Therefore, the expression 1i∈Aˆxt
does not
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depend on the state. Then,
s′a(i) = sa(i)− 1i∈Aˆxt
≤ sb(i)− 1i∈Aˆxt
= s′b(i) .
The second transition above holds because sa 4 sb.
Lemma 4.3. For any states s and s′ with s 4 s′, if action x is feasible for s, then it is feasible
for s′.
Proof. Let the set of active resources whose surpluses are encoded by s be A. For any resource
i ∈ A, if s′(i) = 0, then by definition, we have s(i) = 0. Since x is feasible for s, we know that
for every such i, x(i) = 1. Therefore, x is feasible for s.
For each t ∈ [T ], let s∗t to be a vector
〈
c
(
i
)〉
i∈At
. Then we have the following results.
Lemma 4.4. The sequence {s∗t }t∈[T ] of states satisfies the domination condition with σ = 0.
Proof. Let ŝ(t − 1) = s∗t , and ŝ(t
′) = gt(ŝ(t
′ − 1), xγ(t)) for every t′ ∈ [t, T ]. Since s∗t encodes
the full capacities of the resources in At, for any policy γ, it trivially holds that s
γ(t− 1) 4
s∗t = ŝ(t − 1). Now suppose that s
γ(t′) 4 ŝ(t′) for t′ ∈ [t − 1, T − 1]. By definition, the action
xγ(t′ + 1) is feasible for sγ(t′). Therefore, it can be inferred from Lemma 4.3 that xγ(t′ + 1) is
also feasible for ŝ(t′). Using Lemma 4.2, we can obtain that
sγ(t′ + 1) = gt′+1
(
sγ(t′), xγ(t′ + 1)
)
4 gt′+1
(
ŝ(t′), xγ(t′ + 1)
)
= ŝ(t′ + 1) .
Therefore, it can be proved inductively that sγ(t′) 4 ŝ(t′) holds for every t′ ∈ [t− 1, T − 1]. By
Lemma 4.3, it ensures that the action xγ(t′ + 1) is feasible for ŝ(t′). Furthermore, by Lemma
4.1, it holds for every t′ ∈ [t − 1, T − 1] that ft′+1
(
sγ(t′), xγ(t′ + 1)
)
= ft′+1
(
ŝ(t′), xγ(t′ + 1)
)
.
Then this proof is completed.
Lemma 4.5. There exists a chasing oracle OChasing whose CR is bounded by D + 2C ·W .
Proof. We show the existence of OChasing by constructing such an oracle that satisfies the online
chasing condition and gives the desired CR. Given a starting round tinit and a starting state sinit
as the initial parameters, the oracle OChasing works as follows. For every t ≥ tinit, if t > tinit and
st(i) = c
(
i
)
for every i ∈ At, then O
Chasing terminates, otherwise it posts a price vector that
only contains 1. Such an action is trivially feasible, and it rejects any user t since vt < 1.
It is easy to see that when OChasing terminates at some round tfinal, it satisfies the requirement
that either s∗tfinal is reached, or tfinal = T + 1. Now we proceed to analyze the CR.
Proposition 4.6. Let tinter = tinit +D, and I =
∣∣∣{i : ta(i) ∈ [tinter, tfinal]}∣∣∣, then I ≤W .
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that I > W . This means that tinter ≤ tfinal, since otherwise I =
0. In such case, let t be the smallest integer in [tinter, tfinal) so that
∣∣∣{i : ta(i) ∈ [tinter, t]}∣∣∣ = W .
For every resource i ∈ At, we have ta(i) ≥ tinit. This is because if there exists a resource i
′ ∈ At
with ta(i
′) < tinit, then by Eq. (3), we have te(i) ≥ te(i
′) > t for every i with ta(i) ∈ [tinter, t], as
ta(i) ≥ tinter ≥ ta(i
′) +D. Then it holds for every i with ta(i) ∈ [tinter, t] that i ∈ At. This gives
|At| ≥ 1 +
∣∣∣{i : ta(i) ∈ [tinter, t]}∣∣∣ = W + 1, which conflicts with the setting |At| ≤W .
For every i ∈ At, since ta(i) ≥ tinit, it cannot be allocated to any user t
′ ∈ [tinter, t] because
p(i) is set to 1. Therefore, the state reached by OChasing at round t contains the full capacity of
every active resource, which means that it is a dominant state. This conflicts with the termina-
tion condition of the chasing oracle. Therefore, this proposition holds.  (Proposition 4.6)
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Proposition 4.6 implies that the total number of resources that can be assigned to the users
in [tinter, tfinal) is no more than (|Atinter | + I)C ≤ 2WC. Since the payment for any resource is
less than 1, it holds for any γ that
tfinal−1∑
t=tinit
ft
(
sγ(t− 1), xγ(t)
)
=
tinter−1∑
t=tinit
ft
(
sγ(t− 1), xγ(t)
)
+
tfinal−1∑
t=tinter
ft
(
sγ(t− 1), xγ(t)
)
≤ D+2C·W .
where
∑tinter−1
t=tinit
ft
(
sγ(t− 1), xγ(t)
)
< D because the payment obtained from every user in
[tinit, tinter − 1] is less than 1. Since the total payment is always non-negative, the CR is at
most D + 2C ·W .
Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5 imply that {s∗t }t∈[T ] satisfies the σ-Dominance&Chasing con-
dition with σ = D + 2CW . The following result can be directly inferred from Theorem 3.2,
Lemma 4.4, and Lemma 4.5.
Theorem 4.7. The regret of LBPP is bounded by
O
(√
(C ·W +D)T log |Γ|
)
.
Notably, the guarantee that LBPP is no-regret requires the modeling assumptions stated
earlier in Section 2.1 that (C ·W +D) · log |Γ| = o(T ). By contrast, no posted pricing mechanism
can guarantee a sublinear regret when C ·W = Ω(T ), as we prove in Section 6. See Theorem 6.1
for more details.
5 Applications of the DRACC Problem
The mechanism LBPP proposed for the DRACC problem can be directly applied to a large family
of online pricing problems arising in practice. Two examples are presented in this section, the
Online Job Scheduling (OJS) problem and the problem of Matching over Dynamic Bipartite
Graphs (MDBG).
5.1 Online Job Scheduling
The OJS problem described in this section is motivated by the application of assigning jobs that
arrive online to slots with limited bandwidths for maximizing the total payments from the jobs.
Formally, in the OJS problem, there are T jobs arriving sequentially over N slots. Each slot
i ∈ [N ] is associated with a bandwidth c(i), which means that this slot can be allocated to at
most c(i) jobs. For each job t ∈ T , an adversary specifies an arrival slot at ∈ [N ], a departure
slot dt ∈ [at, N ], a length lt ∈ [dt−at+1], and a value vt ∈ [0, 1) in advance. The interval [at, dt]
is denoted by At. The maximum number of slots in At over every t ∈ T is denoted by W . The
bandwidths {c(i)}i∈[N ] and the parameters of the jobs are revealed dynamically.
In particular, the jobs t ∈ [T ] arrive in the order of
〈
at
〉
t∈T
, and the bandwidth c(i) of each
slot i ∈ [N ] is revealed just before the arrival of the first job t which satisfies at = max{1, i −
W + 1}. A posted price mechanism for the OJS problem is required to present a price vector
pt ∈ (0, 1]
W of length W for each arrival job t ∈ T without knowing the parameters {dt, lt, vt}.
For each job t and a price vector p presented to t, define
Aˆpt =
{
∅ if vt < argmin[i,i+lt−1]⊆At
∑i+lt−1
i′=i pt(i
′)
argmax[i,i+lt−1]⊆At vt −
∑i+lt−1
i′=i pt(i
′) otherwise
,
where ties are broken in a fixed manner, and let qˆpt =
∑
i∈Aˆpt
pt(i). Then the job t takes one
unit of bandwidth from every slot in Aˆpt and pays qˆt. Immediately after the decision is made
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for job t, the parameters {dt, lt, vt} are revealed to the mechanism. The mechanism is allowed
to use random bits when deciding the price vectors, and its goal is to maximize the expected
revenue.
Notice that for each job t ∈ T , the full bandwidth c(i) of every slot i ∈ At have been revealed
before the arrival of t. Let the vector of the remaining bandwidths of the slots in At before the
arrival of t be λt. A price vector pt is said to be feasible for λt if for every slot i ∈ At with
λt(i) = 0, pt(i) = 1 so that this slot cannot be chosen by t. The mechanism is forced to post a
feasible price vector pt for every t ∈ [T ]. A feasible one-shot pricing policy γ is a mapping from
each remaining bandwidth vector λ to a price vector p so that p is feasible for λ. Let pγt be the
price vector given by γ for job t after inductively applying γ to all the previous jobs [t− 1], the
regret of a mechanism is defined to be
max
γ∈Γ
∑
t∈[T ]
qˆ
p
γ
t
t −
∑
t∈[T ]
E
[
qˆptt
]
,
where Γ is a collection of pricing policies given as input. For the OJS problem, we make the
following assumptions.
• Bounded parameters: the bandwidth c(i) for every slot i has an upper bound C ≥ 1 such
that C ·W · log |Γ| = o(T ).
• Finite prices: the price of any slot is chosen from a finite set P ⊂ (0, 1] which implicitly
includes 1.
Reduction to DRACC An instance of the OJS problem can be transformed into a DRACC
instance in an online manner. In particular, each job t is mapped to a user, and each slot i is
mapped to a resource with with capacity c(i). For each slot i which reveals its bandwidth c(i)
after the arrival of job t but before the arrival of job t + 1, we set ta(i) = t. The expiry time
te(i) is set to to t − 1 upon the arrival of the job t that satisfies at > i. Note that the expiry
time te(i) of the slot i with aT = i is never specified, but it does not influence the feasibility
of this instance, because the expiration time of this slot is never used in the algorithm. For
convenience, we set the expiration time of this slot to T + 1. It can be verified that for any two
slots i, i′ with ta(i) ≤ ta(i
′), we have te(i) ≤ te(i
′), which means that Eq. (3) is satisfied with
D = 0. Then the following result can be directly inferred from Theorem 4.7.
Corollary 5.1. The regret of mechanism LBPP in the OJS problem is bounded by O
(√
CW · T · log |Γ|
)
.
5.2 Matching Over Dynamic Bipartite Graphs
The MDBG problem is a dynamic variation of the conventional bipartite matching problem with
the goal of maximizing the revenue. Formally, in the MDBG problem, there are two sets of nodes,
the left-side node set Left = {i}i∈[N ] and the right-side node set Right = {t}t∈[T ]. The nodes in
each of these two sets arrive sequentially and dynamically. For each node i ∈ Left, an adversary
specifies a pair of parameters ta(i) ∈ [T ] and te(i) ∈
[
ta(i), [T ]
]
. It means that the node i arrives
just before the arrival of the node t = ta(i) ∈ Right, and expires immediately after the node
t′ = te(i) ∈ Right is given. For each node t ∈ Right, define At = {i ∈ Left : t ∈ [ta(i), te(i)]}.
The adversary also specifies a value vt(i) ∈ [0, 1) for each t ∈ Right and i ∈ At.
A posted price mechanism is required to present a price vector pt ∈ (0, 1]
|At| independently
of vt(·) upon the arrival of each node t ∈ Right. For any price vector p presented to t, define
Aˆpt = argmaxi∈At vt(i) − p(i) with breaking ties in a fixed way. The mechanism matches the
left-side node Aˆpt to the right-side node t and charges t the payment p
(
Aˆpt
)
if vt
(
Aˆpt
)
≥ p
(
Aˆpt
)
.
Otherwise, no left node is matched to t, and no payment is obtained. After that, vt(·) is revealed
to the mechanism.
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In the MDBG problem, every left-side node i can only be matched to at most one right-side
node t. We express this constraint as a feasibility requirement on the price vector that for each
right-side node t, if a left-side node i ∈ At has already been matched before the arrival of t,
then the price of i should be set to 1. The states of whether the left-side nodes in At have been
matched can be described with a Boolean vector of length |At|, and a pricing policy γ ∈ Γ is
a mapping from each possible Boolean vector to a feasible price vector. The objective of the
MDBG problem is to find a feasible price vector pt for every t ∈ Right to maximize the total
payments, and the regret is defined to be the difference between the revenue obtained by the
best fixed in-hindsight pricing policy in a given collection Γ and the expected revenue of the
mechanism. We make the following assumption for the MDBG problem.
• Bounded parameters: Let D be a non-negative number such that for any two left-side
nodes i and i′, if ta(i) +D ≤ ta(i
′), then te(i) ≤ te(i
′). Denote the upper bound on |At|
over the right-side nodes t by W . We assume that (W +D) log |Γ| = o(T ).
• Finite discrete prices: the prices are taken from a finite set P ⊂ (0, 1] with 1 ∈ P.
Reduction to DRACC This problem can be transformed to a special case of the DRACC
problem by taking the nodes in Left (resp. Right) as the resources (resp. users). The capacity
of every resource is exactly one. The valuation function of each user t maps each single resource
i ∈ At to vt(i), while mapping any other subset of the resources in At to 0. Using Theorem 4.7,
we get the following result.
Corollary 5.2. For the MDBG problem, the regret of the mechanism LBPP is bounded by
O
(√
(W +D) · T · log |Γ|
)
.
6 No-regret and Necessity of Modeling Assumptions
In this section, we justify the necessity of our modeling assumptions in Section 2.1 by proving
that the vanishing regret is impossible if C ·W grows linearly with T .
Theorem 6.1. If C ·W = Ω(T ), then the regret of any posted price mechanism is Ω(T ), even
if D = 0.
Proof. Here we construct two instances of DRACC. The following settings are the same between
these two instances.
• The parameters C and W are chosen so that C ·W = T2 . Set N = W .
• For each resource i, ta(i) = 1 and te(i) = T . This setting implies that for every user t,
At = [N ], which is consistent with W = N . Every i ∈ [N ] has the same capacity c(i) = C.
• For each user t ∈
[
1, T2
]
, the valuation function vt is set as follows.
vt(A
′) =
{
1
2 if |A
′| = 1
0 otherwise
∀A′ ⊆ At .
For the users t ∈
[
T
2 +1, T
]
, their valuation functions are different between the two instances.
In particular, in the first instance, vt(A
′) = 0 for any A′ ⊆ At, while in the second instance
vt(A
′) =
{
1− ǫ if |A′| = 1
0 otherwise
∀A′ ⊆ At .
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where ǫ is some small enough constant in (0, 12).
Now consider an arbitrary deterministic mechanism M. Such a mechanism will output the
same sequence of price vectors for the first half of the users in these two instances. Therefore,
the total number of resources that are allocated byM to the first half of users must be the same
k in the two instances for some k ∈
[
0, T2
]
. Then, the revenue of M is at most k2 in the former
instance, while at most k2 +
(
T
2 −k
)
· (1− ǫ) = 1−ǫ2 T − (
1
2 − ǫ)k in the latter one. Now consider a
pricing policy γ that maps every surplus vector except
〈
0
〉
to a price vector that only contains
1
2 . The revenue of γ in the first instance is
T
4 . Similarly, there exists a policy γ
′ with revenue
T
2 · (1− ǫ) in the second instance. Therefore, the regret of M is at least
max
{
T
4
−
k
2
,
T
2
(1− ǫ)−
[1− ǫ
2
T − (
1
2
− ǫ)k
]}
≥
1− 2ǫ
8(1− ǫ)
T .
To generalize the result above to the mechanisms that can utilize the random bits, here we
adopt Yao’s principle Yao (1977). In particular, we construct a distribution over the inputs
which assigns probabilities 1−2ǫ2−2ǫ and
1
2−2ǫ to the two instances constructed above, respectively.
It can be verified that against such a distribution, the expectation of any random mechanism’s
regret is at least 1−2ǫ8(1−ǫ)T . By Yao’s principle, the lower bound on the regret of any mechanism
that can utilizes the random bits is also 1−2ǫ8(1−ǫ)T .
In the two instances above, all the resources i have the same arrival time ta(i) and expiry time
te(i), which means that Eq. (3) holds with D = 0. Therefore, this proposition is established.
7 External Regret
In Arora et al. (2018), it is shown that for the online learning problems where the reward func-
tions depend on the m-recent actions, the policy regret and the external regret are incomparable,
which means that any algorithm with a sublinear policy regret has a linear external regret, and
vice visa. Based on the techniques proposed in Arora et al. (2018), we prove that such a state-
ment also holds for the online learning problem on the Dd-MDP with dominant states.
Theorem 7.1. There exists an instance of the Dd-MDP with dominant states so that for any
online learning algorithm having a sublinear policy regret on this instance, it cannot guarantee a
sublinear external regret on the same instance, and vice visa.
Proof. We start by constructing a deterministic MDP instance and proving that it is a feasible
Dd-MDP instance with a constant σ.
/.-,()*+1
0 //0
%% .-,()*+2
0 //
0
hh .-,()*+3
0 //
0
xx
· · ·
0 // /.-,()*+m
1
ff 0.5ff (9)
Consider the deterministic MDP instance with m > 2 states in Eq. (9), wherem is a constant
independent of T . Each state in this instance is labeled with a distinct integer in [m]. The action
set contains two actions, which are denoted by Forward and Backward, respectively. These
two actions are feasible for every state. The state transition functions gt and reward functions
ft are fixed for all t ∈ [T ] as follows.
gt(s, x) =

s+ 1 if s < m
∧
x = Forward
m if s = m
∧
x = Forward
1 if x = Backward
, ft(s, x) =

0.5 if s = m
∧
x = Forward
1 if s = m
∧
x = Backward
0 otherwise
.
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By taking the state m as the dominant state s∗t for every t ∈ [T ], it is easy to see that the online
chasing condition is satisfied: one can always reach the state m in at most m− 1 rounds, which
means that the CR is bounded by a constant m− 1. Now consider the dominant condition. For
an arbitrary policy γ and an arbitrary round t, let t′ be the first round no earlier than t such
that a decision maker Mγ who repeatedly applies γ takes the action Backward at t
′. For an
algorithm that takes the same actions as Mγ from t at the state m, its cumulative reward is no
smaller than the cumulative reward obtained by Mγ during [t, t
′ − 1], while from round t′ + 1,
this algorithm andMγ will visit the same sequence of states and get the same rewards, because
both of them are at the state 1 in round t′ + 1. So, the total reward obtained by this algorithm
from t is at most 1 smaller than Mγ . This implies that the dominant condition is also satisfied
by taking σ as a constant.
Let the number of rounds that an arbitrary algorithm performs the actions Forward and
Backward at the state m be k and k′, respectively. Note that each time an algorithm performs
Backward at the state m, then it needs to take at least m− 1 rounds to go back to the state
m. It implies that k +m · k′ ≤ T . The total reward obtained by this algorithm is
1
2
k + k′ ≤
1
2
k +
1
m
(T − k) . (10)
Since the total reward by repeating a fixed policy γF that maps every state to Forward is at
least 12 (T −m), the policy regret is at least (
1
2 −
1
m
)(T − k)− m2 . Therefore, if the policy regret
is sublinear in T , we have k = T − o(T ). Now, consider another policy γB that maps every state
to the action Backward. We have
T∑
t=1
ft(st−1, γ
′(st−1))−
T∑
t=1
ft(st−1, xt) ≥
(
1−
1
2
)
· k ,
which implies that the external regret is linear in T .
Now consider an arbirary algorithm whose external regret is sublinear in T . Then, the total
reward of this algorithm is at most T
m
+ o(T ), because otherwise it can still be inferred from
Eq. (10) that k is linear in T , which leads to a linear external regret. Recall that the total
reward of repeating the policy γF is (T −m)/2. Therefore, the policy regret is linear in T .
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